feat(security): enhance input validation and security measures across various routes
All checks were successful
Build & Push Docker Image / build (push) Successful in 6m38s

This commit is contained in:
2026-03-04 08:39:29 +01:00
parent ba096a31a2
commit e22a895672
13 changed files with 222 additions and 29 deletions

View File

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ router.post('/users', authenticateToken, requireAdmin, async (req, res) => {
return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Username is already taken' });
}
const hash = bcrypt.hashSync(password, 12);
const hash = await bcrypt.hash(password, 12);
const result = await db.run(
'INSERT INTO users (name, display_name, email, password_hash, role, email_verified) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 1)',
[name, display_name, email.toLowerCase(), hash, validRole]
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ router.put('/users/:id/password', authenticateToken, requireAdmin, async (req, r
}
const db = getDb();
const hash = bcrypt.hashSync(newPassword, 12);
const hash = await bcrypt.hash(newPassword, 12);
await db.run('UPDATE users SET password_hash = ?, updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id = ?', [hash, req.params.id]);
res.json({ message: 'Password reset' });

View File

@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ router.post('/register', registerLimiter, async (req, res) => {
return res.status(409).json({ error: 'Username is already taken' });
}
const hash = bcrypt.hashSync(password, 12);
const hash = await bcrypt.hash(password, 12);
// If SMTP is configured, require email verification
if (isMailerConfigured()) {
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ router.post('/login', loginLimiter, async (req, res) => {
}
const token = generateToken(user.id);
const { password_hash, ...safeUser } = user;
const { password_hash, verification_token, verification_token_expires, verification_resend_at, ...safeUser } = user;
res.json({ token, user: safeUser });
} catch (err) {
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ router.put('/password', authenticateToken, passwordLimiter, async (req, res) =>
return res.status(400).json({ error: `New password must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters long` });
}
const hash = bcrypt.hashSync(newPassword, 12);
const hash = await bcrypt.hash(newPassword, 12);
await db.run('UPDATE users SET password_hash = ?, updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id = ?', [hash, req.user.id]);
res.json({ message: 'Password changed successfully' });
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ router.put('/password', authenticateToken, passwordLimiter, async (req, res) =>
// POST /api/auth/avatar - Upload avatar image
router.post('/avatar', authenticateToken, avatarLimiter, async (req, res) => {
try {
// Validate content type
// Validate file content by checking magic bytes (file signatures)
const contentType = req.headers['content-type'];
if (!contentType || !contentType.startsWith('image/')) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Only image files are allowed' });
@@ -528,7 +528,18 @@ router.post('/avatar', authenticateToken, avatarLimiter, async (req, res) => {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Image must not exceed 2MB' });
}
const ext = contentType.includes('png') ? 'png' : contentType.includes('gif') ? 'gif' : contentType.includes('webp') ? 'webp' : 'jpg';
// Validate magic bytes to prevent Content-Type spoofing
const magicBytes = buffer.slice(0, 8);
const isJPEG = magicBytes[0] === 0xFF && magicBytes[1] === 0xD8 && magicBytes[2] === 0xFF;
const isPNG = magicBytes[0] === 0x89 && magicBytes[1] === 0x50 && magicBytes[2] === 0x4E && magicBytes[3] === 0x47;
const isGIF = magicBytes[0] === 0x47 && magicBytes[1] === 0x49 && magicBytes[2] === 0x46;
const isWEBP = magicBytes[0] === 0x52 && magicBytes[1] === 0x49 && magicBytes[2] === 0x46 && magicBytes[3] === 0x46
&& buffer.length > 11 && buffer[8] === 0x57 && buffer[9] === 0x45 && buffer[10] === 0x42 && buffer[11] === 0x50;
if (!isJPEG && !isPNG && !isGIF && !isWEBP) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'File content does not match a supported image format (JPEG, PNG, GIF, WebP)' });
}
const ext = isPNG ? 'png' : isGIF ? 'gif' : isWEBP ? 'webp' : 'jpg';
const filename = `${req.user.id}_${Date.now()}.${ext}`;
const filepath = path.join(uploadsDir, filename);

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,16 @@ const router = Router();
const SAFE_ID_RE = /^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,50}$/;
// Validate that a URL uses a safe scheme (http/https only)
function isSafeUrl(url) {
try {
const parsed = new URL(url);
return parsed.protocol === 'https:' || parsed.protocol === 'http:';
} catch {
return false;
}
}
// Ensure uploads/branding directory exists
const brandingDir = path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'uploads', 'branding');
if (!fs.existsSync(brandingDir)) {
@@ -221,6 +231,9 @@ router.put('/imprint-url', authenticateToken, requireAdmin, async (req, res) =>
if (imprintUrl && imprintUrl.length > 500) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'URL must not exceed 500 characters' });
}
if (imprintUrl && imprintUrl.trim() && !isSafeUrl(imprintUrl.trim())) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'URL must start with http:// or https://' });
}
if (imprintUrl && imprintUrl.trim()) {
await setSetting('imprint_url', imprintUrl.trim());
} else {
@@ -240,6 +253,9 @@ router.put('/privacy-url', authenticateToken, requireAdmin, async (req, res) =>
if (privacyUrl && privacyUrl.length > 500) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'URL must not exceed 500 characters' });
}
if (privacyUrl && privacyUrl.trim() && !isSafeUrl(privacyUrl.trim())) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'URL must start with http:// or https://' });
}
if (privacyUrl && privacyUrl.trim()) {
await setSetting('privacy_url', privacyUrl.trim());
} else {

View File

@@ -192,16 +192,28 @@ async function caldavAuth(req, res, next) {
res.set('WWW-Authenticate', 'Basic realm="Redlight CalDAV"');
return res.status(401).end();
}
// Hash the provided token with SHA-256 for constant-time comparison in SQL
const tokenHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex');
const tokenRow = await db.get(
'SELECT * FROM caldav_tokens WHERE user_id = ? AND token_hash = ?',
[user.id, tokenHash],
);
// Fallback: also check legacy plaintext tokens for backward compatibility
const tokenRowLegacy = !tokenRow ? await db.get(
'SELECT * FROM caldav_tokens WHERE user_id = ? AND token = ?',
[user.id, token],
);
if (!tokenRow) {
) : null;
const matchedToken = tokenRow || tokenRowLegacy;
if (!matchedToken) {
res.set('WWW-Authenticate', 'Basic realm="Redlight CalDAV"');
return res.status(401).end();
}
// Migrate legacy plaintext token to hashed version
if (tokenRowLegacy && !tokenRow) {
db.run('UPDATE caldav_tokens SET token_hash = ?, token = NULL WHERE id = ?', [tokenHash, matchedToken.id]).catch(() => {});
}
// Update last_used_at (fire and forget)
db.run('UPDATE caldav_tokens SET last_used_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id = ?', [tokenRow.id]).catch(() => {});
db.run('UPDATE caldav_tokens SET last_used_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id = ?', [matchedToken.id]).catch(() => {});
req.caldavUser = user;
next();
} catch (err) {
@@ -218,6 +230,15 @@ function setDAVHeaders(res) {
res.set('MS-Author-Via', 'DAV');
}
// ── CalDAV username authorization ──────────────────────────────────────────
// Ensures the :username param matches the authenticated user's email
function validateCalDAVUser(req, res, next) {
if (req.params.username && decodeURIComponent(req.params.username) !== req.caldavUser.email) {
return res.status(403).end();
}
next();
}
// ── Base URL helper ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function baseUrl(req) {
const proto = req.get('x-forwarded-proto') || req.protocol;
@@ -280,7 +301,7 @@ router.all('/', caldavAuth, async (req, res) => {
// ── PROPFIND /{username}/ ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
// User principal: tells the client where the calendar home is.
router.all('/:username/', caldavAuth, async (req, res) => {
router.all('/:username/', caldavAuth, validateCalDAVUser, async (req, res) => {
if (req.method !== 'PROPFIND') {
setDAVHeaders(res);
return res.status(405).end();
@@ -302,7 +323,7 @@ router.all('/:username/', caldavAuth, async (req, res) => {
});
// ── PROPFIND + REPORT /{username}/calendar/ ────────────────────────────────
router.all('/:username/calendar/', caldavAuth, async (req, res) => {
router.all('/:username/calendar/', caldavAuth, validateCalDAVUser, async (req, res) => {
const db = getDb();
const calendarHref = `/caldav/${encodeURIComponent(req.caldavUser.email)}/calendar/`;
@@ -411,7 +432,7 @@ router.all('/:username/calendar/', caldavAuth, async (req, res) => {
});
// ── GET /{username}/calendar/{uid}.ics ────────────────────────────────────
router.get('/:username/calendar/:filename', caldavAuth, async (req, res) => {
router.get('/:username/calendar/:filename', caldavAuth, validateCalDAVUser, async (req, res) => {
const uid = req.params.filename.replace(/\.ics$/, '');
const db = getDb();
const ev = await db.get(
@@ -426,7 +447,7 @@ router.get('/:username/calendar/:filename', caldavAuth, async (req, res) => {
});
// ── PUT /{username}/calendar/{uid}.ics — create or update ─────────────────
router.put('/:username/calendar/:filename', caldavAuth, async (req, res) => {
router.put('/:username/calendar/:filename', caldavAuth, validateCalDAVUser, async (req, res) => {
const uid = req.params.filename.replace(/\.ics$/, '');
const body = typeof req.body === 'string' ? req.body : '';
@@ -488,7 +509,7 @@ router.put('/:username/calendar/:filename', caldavAuth, async (req, res) => {
});
// ── DELETE /{username}/calendar/{uid}.ics ─────────────────────────────────
router.delete('/:username/calendar/:filename', caldavAuth, async (req, res) => {
router.delete('/:username/calendar/:filename', caldavAuth, validateCalDAVUser, async (req, res) => {
const uid = req.params.filename.replace(/\.ics$/, '');
const db = getDb();
const ev = await db.get(

View File

@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ import { rateLimit } from 'express-rate-limit';
const router = Router();
// Allowlist for CSS color values - only permits hsl(), hex (#rgb/#rrggbb) and plain names
const SAFE_COLOR_RE = /^(?:#[0-9a-fA-F]{3,8}|hsl\(\d{1,3},\s*\d{1,3}%,\s*\d{1,3}%\)|[a-zA-Z]{1,30})$/;
// Rate limit for federation calendar receive
const calendarFederationLimiter = rateLimit({
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
@@ -121,6 +124,11 @@ router.post('/events', authenticateToken, async (req, res) => {
if (title.length > 200) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Title must not exceed 200 characters' });
if (description && description.length > 5000) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Description must not exceed 5000 characters' });
// Validate color format
if (color && !SAFE_COLOR_RE.test(color)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid color format' });
}
const startDate = new Date(start_time);
const endDate = new Date(end_time);
if (isNaN(startDate.getTime()) || isNaN(endDate.getTime())) {
@@ -172,6 +180,11 @@ router.put('/events/:id', authenticateToken, async (req, res) => {
if (title && title.length > 200) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Title must not exceed 200 characters' });
if (description && description.length > 5000) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Description must not exceed 5000 characters' });
// Validate color format
if (color && !SAFE_COLOR_RE.test(color)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid color format' });
}
if (start_time && end_time) {
const s = new Date(start_time);
const e = new Date(end_time);

View File

@@ -161,6 +161,16 @@ router.post('/receive', federationReceiveLimiter, async (req, res) => {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Incomplete invitation payload' });
}
// Validate join_url scheme to prevent javascript: or other malicious URIs
try {
const parsedUrl = new URL(join_url);
if (parsedUrl.protocol !== 'https:' && parsedUrl.protocol !== 'http:') {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'join_url must use https:// or http://' });
}
} catch {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid join_url format' });
}
// S4: validate field lengths from remote to prevent oversized DB entries
if (invite_id.length > 100 || from_user.length > 200 || to_user.length > 200 ||
room_name.length > 200 || join_url.length > 2000 || (message && message.length > 5000)) {

View File

@@ -709,6 +709,15 @@ router.post('/:uid/presentation', authenticateToken, async (req, res) => {
const ext = extMap[contentType];
if (!ext) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Unsupported file type. Allowed: PDF, PPT, PPTX, ODP, DOC, DOCX' });
// Validate magic bytes to prevent Content-Type spoofing
const magic = buffer.slice(0, 8);
const isPDF = magic[0] === 0x25 && magic[1] === 0x50 && magic[2] === 0x44 && magic[3] === 0x46; // %PDF
const isZip = magic[0] === 0x50 && magic[1] === 0x4B && magic[2] === 0x03 && magic[3] === 0x04; // PK (PPTX, DOCX, ODP, etc.)
const isOle = magic[0] === 0xD0 && magic[1] === 0xCF && magic[2] === 0x11 && magic[3] === 0xE0; // OLE2 (PPT, DOC)
if (ext === 'pdf' && !isPDF) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'File content does not match PDF format' });
if (['pptx', 'docx', 'odp'].includes(ext) && !isZip) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'File content does not match expected archive format' });
if (['ppt', 'doc'].includes(ext) && !isOle) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'File content does not match expected document format' });
// Preserve original filename (sent as X-Filename header)
const rawName = req.headers['x-filename'];
const originalName = rawName